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1 Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  A version of this lecture
was presented in a workshop at the University of San Diego, and I thank the participants for their
helpful suggestions.  The audience at the Gianella lecture itself raised challenging questions and
objections calling for further reflection, but it seemed best to leave the lecture itself more or less in the
form in which it was delivered.
2 I bow to convention here in referring to these themes as “principles.”  It might be better to call
them– or at least to call the one I favor here– “ideals” or “aspirations” or “guiding criteria.”  And if
someone thinks that what I am calling here the “nonsectarian principle” does not really qualify as a true
constitutional “principle,” I at least will be relieved.  Cf. Steven D. Smith, Getting Over Equality: A
Critical Diagnosis of Religious Freedom in America 62-82 (2001) (questioning the value of “principles”
in establishment clause jurisprudence).
3 328 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), revised, 328 F.3d 466, reversed sub. nom. Elk Grove Unified
School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. __ (2004).
1
NONESTABLISHMENT “UNDER GOD”?  THE NONSECTARIAN PRINCIPLE
Steven D. Smith1
It is imprudent to try to do too much in a single lecture, so I want to attempt one fairly modest
(but still, I believe, important) task.  I stress that what follows is not offered as a complete theory of
nonestablishment, much less of the First Amendment.  My more modest goal is to try to disentangle
three themes that are often conflated, with baneful effect.  We can call these the “public secularism”
principle, the “neutrality” principle, and the “nonsectarian principle.”2  My own view is that the first two
of these principles have exercised a pernicious influence over First Amendment jurisprudence: but the
third, if it could be extracted so that its own distinctive virtues could be appreciated, might provide
valuable mooring for what is at present a deeply disoriented discourse.
As a lead-in to this issue, consider the Ninth Circuit’s controversial decision in Newdow v.
United States Congress declaring unconstitutional the inclusion of the words “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance.3  The court incurred widespread criticism for its decision, but even if you believe
2
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4 See, e.g., Elk Grove School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. ___,     (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
5 For a much more detailed (and, I think, persuasive) argument for the point, see Steven G.
Gey, “Under God,” The Pledge of Allegiance, and Other Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1865
(2003).
6 See infra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
7 As it turned out, the Supreme Court decided not to reach the merits, instead reversing the
Ninth Circuit decision on the ground that the plaintiff, a noncustodial parent, lacked standing, 542 U.S.
__ (2004); but Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas wrote concurring opinions
addressing the merits.  The issue now awaits relitigation by a party with standing.  Because of this
disposition of the case, the legal posture of the issue remains largely unchanged, and it has accordingly
seemed possible and appropriate to leave the lecture largely in the form in which it was delivered.  I
2
(as I do) that the result was wrong-headed, this criticism may seem to be a case of blaming the
messenger.  After all, the Ninth Circuit was merely applying in a plausible and faithful way the doctrines
announced by its institutional superior, the U. S. Supreme Court.  Clear away all the mostly sophomoric
sophistry4 and it’s pretty straightforward, really.  The Supreme Court has said that government is
constitutionally forbidden to endorse religion.  The words “under God” endorsed religion when they
were added to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954– indeed, they were added partly for that purpose– and
surely for millions of Americans they still do.  QED.5
Of course, one might also argue that the criticism aimed at the Ninth Circuit was deserved
because, as we will see later, the Supreme Court has made it clear enough that it itself has no intention
of applying the “no endorsement” doctrine in a plausible and faithful way6 and that it does not want the
doctrine applied in a plausible and faithful way.  So perhaps faithful application of the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements is actually unfaithful to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements.  It’s hard to say:
depending on whether the Court decides to reach the merits of the case, we may soon find out.7
3
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have however added several references to the Supreme Court concurring opinions in footnotes.
8 292 F.3d at 607-08.
3
For present purposes, in any case, we can focus on one particular assertion made by the
Newdow majority.  “A profession that we are a nation ‘under God’,” the court said, “is identical, for
Establishment Clause purposes, to a profession that we are a nation ‘under Jesus,’ a nation ‘under
Vishnu,’ a nation ‘under Zeus,’ or a nation ‘under no god,’ because none of these professions can be
neutral with respect to religion.”8  The court evidently intended this observation as a powerful rhetorical
uppercut– a sort of reductio ad absurdum of the case for keeping “under God” in the Pledge.
But are these different professions in fact identical?  In their actual content, the professions are
obviously far from identical; they may even be antithetical (“under God” as opposed to “under no
god”).  Still, depending on what categories or criteria we are using, we can view the professions as
“identical” in the sense that they fall into the same class or category.  If your consuming interest is
“baseball,” for example, so that for you the interesting categories for classifying the various things
people say are “statements about baseball” and “statements not about baseball,” then all of the
professions recited by the court will fall into the second category: they are not about baseball.  In that
sense we might say, carelessly, that these statements are “identical.”  In Newdow, the court was
explicitly assuming an Establishment Clause principle of “neutrality” that effectively constructed two
categories for classifying public professions: “neutral toward religion” and “not neutral toward religion.” 
Within that conceptual scheme, the court plausibly concluded that all of the professions it listed were
not neutral toward religion– and hence were “identical.”
Okay so far.  But we can still ask: Is this a sensible conceptual scheme?  Many people might
4
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9 See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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feel intuitively that there is a significant difference among these various statements; and so they might
wonder about the cogency of a scheme within which the differences between “under God,” “under
Jesus,” “under Vishnu,” and “under no god” do not even register.  In support of this suspicion, they
might observe that under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, many of the most cherished pronouncements in
the American political tradition– including Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address, the Declaration of
Independence, and (ironically) Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom9– would likewise fall
into the forbidden category and hence would need to be banished, or at least expurgated.  This
conclusion seems troublesome.  Could it be that the Ninth Circuit’s whole approach– an approach, I
reiterate, enjoined upon it by the Supreme Court– misconceived the constitutional principles at stake?
I think the answer is yes, and I want to suggest that the error results from conflating what is a
valid and important American tradition of nonsectarianism with the quite different notions of secularism
and neutrality.
THREE PRINCIPLES
So let me start by attempting a rough description of what these three principles mean.  I trust
that you will not expect anything definitive; after all, these terms are often used variously, and loosely,
and (as I have said) interchangeably.
Public secularism.  Start with the principle of “public secularism”– a principle that pervades a
good deal of constitutional discourse and that is reflected in modern constitutional doctrine insisting that
5
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10 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
11 The battered dictionary that I still have from undergraduate days, for instance, gives as its first
definition of “secular”: “of or relating to the worldly or temporal.”  Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary 1044 (1973).
12 For a discussion of the evolution of these usages, see Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the
Modern World 12-17 (1994).
13 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
5
government must act only for “secular” purposes.10  The term “secular” is used in different senses, and
there is a perfectly respectable usage which understands “secular” to mean something like “of or
pertaining to this world,”11 as opposed to things that pertain to some other world or sphere.  In this
sense, something can easily be both “secular” and “religious.”  Thus, historians and others distinguish
the “secular clergy”– that is, the clergy that works in the world, in parishes– from the “regular clergy”
that retreats from the world to the seclusion of a monastery.  To call parish priests “secular” in no way
implies that they have abandoned their religious vocation.12
If the term “secular” is used in this positive way, then I agree that our constitutional tradition
amply supports the assumption that government is supposed to act within the realm of the “secular.” 
And occasionally the courts may use the term in this positive sense.  In Lynch v. Donnelly, for instance
(the first nativity scene case), the Supreme Court said that a creche commemorating the birth of Jesus
served a “secular” function– it commemorated “a significant historical religious event long celebrated in
the Western World“13– but at the same time the Court insisted that this conclusion in no way derogated
from the religious quality of the creche.  There should be nothing especially inflammatory in these claims:
Christmas is widely celebrated in American culture and tradition, and Christmas is typically linked to
6
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14 Justice Blackmun’s characterization was typical: the majority, he charged, had “relegated [the
creche] to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but
devoid of any inherent meaning. . . .”   465 U.S. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
15  See, e.g., 465 U.S. at 685  n. 12: 
Justice Brennan states that "by focusing on the holiday 'context' in which the creche
appear[s]," the Court seeks to "explain away the clear religious import of the creche," . . .
and that it has equated the creche with a Santa's house or a talking wishing well. . . . Of
course this is not true.
See also id. at 681 n. 6:
The City contends that the purposes of the display are "exclusively secular." We hold
only that Pawtucket has a secular purpose for its display, which is all that Lemon
requires. Were the test that the government must have "exclusively secular" objectives,
much of the conduct and legislation this Court has approved in the past would have been
invalidated
6
the birth of Jesus– as historical an event as the birth of George Washington or George Bush.
Indeed, at a deeper level, and perhaps by accident, the Lynch majority was also theologically
cogent.  The birth of Jesus after all dramatically manifests the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation,
which is precisely the claim– a deeply and even scandalously “secular” claim-- that God came into and
lived within this world not just as an exalted visitor but as a full-blooded, fully human participant.  So
if “secular” is used in this inclusive sense, then whether the creche is considered from a cultural or from
a more theological perspective, the majority was plainly right to say that it is a “secular” symbol.
Lynch’s critics, however, have routinely failed to grasp this point, and hence have repeatedly
accused the majority of demeaning the creche or denying its religious character.14  Since the Lynch
majority emphatically did not say this– on the contrary, it explicitly denied saying or meaning any such
thing15– these critics sometimes resort to quoting Justice Blackmun’s characterization to that effect in
7
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16 See, e.g., Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Paying the Words Extra: Religious Discourse in the
Supreme Court of the United States 88 (1994)  (“Burger’s opinion reduces the meaning of the creche
to, in Justice Blackmun’s words, ‘a neutral harbinger of the holiday season’.”)
17 See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1295 (2d ed. 1988) (“Given the
undeniable religious roots of legislative prayers and creches, the Court must have meant that those
practices, although born of religion, had with time lost their religious nature.”).
7
dissent, as if Blackmun were accurately expressing the majority’s view.16  That Blackmun knew what
the majority meant better than the majority did seems improbable.  So it all makes you wonder: Can’t
these critics read?
But the by now almost ritual criticism becomes intelligible, I think, if we recognize that the critics
are presupposing a different conception of the term “secular.”  “Secular,” in this usage, means “not
religious”: “secular” and “religious” are the poles of a dichotomy.  So if Warren Burger said the creche
served a “secular” function, he must have meant that the creche had lost its religious quality17; and if he
also explicitly denied meaning this, well, then he must have been merely confused.  
It’s clear enough, I think, that someone is confused.  But although the critics may have grossly
misread Lynch, I have to concede that their usage of “secular” is more common in modern
constitutional discourse.  So “secular” is typically understood by what it is not– that is, not “religion”–
rather than by what it is.
In sum, the principle of “public secularism,” as reflected for instance in the Lemon doctrine’s
“secular purpose” requirement, is commonly understood to mean that government must refrain from
acting religiously, or for religious purposes, or in support of religion.
Neutrality.  Next let us consider the principle of “neutrality.”  Even more notoriously than with
8
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18 For a critical discussion of some leading versions of neutrality, see Steven D. Smith,
Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 77-97 (1995).
19 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 296, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20 See, e.g., Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (plurality opinion by
Blackmun, J.) (Establishment Clause “prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief”).
21 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 669 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
22 See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Problem of God 99 (1964) (“Atheism is the
public philosophy, established by law.  The establishment was accomplished by the law of separation of
church and state.”).
23 Of course, some religious perspectives also disapprove of neutrality– which is the source of a
similar conundrum for the neutrality principle itself.  See Smith, Foreordained Failure, supra note 18 at
81, 84-88.
8
the term “secular,” “neutrality” is used in many different senses18: it is, as Justice Harlan observed, a
“coat of many colors.”19  Its dominant sense in constitutional discourse, though, seems to be one of “not
taking sides.”  So government must refrain from taking (or even appearing to take) a position either for
or against “religion.”20   Government must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and must not do things
that send messages either endorsing or disapproving religion.21
Just how the principles of “public secularism” and “neutrality” square– or clash-- with each
other presents a complicated problem.  One obvious difficulty arises because at least some religious
perspectives disapprove of public secularism; they regard it as a species of atheism.22  So a secular
government will plainly not be neutral with respect to that kind of religion.23  Another difficulty is that in
some contexts, neutrality is often taken to mean that “religion”– religious schools, or “faith-based
organizations”– may be or even must be included among the recipients of governmental aid or among
9
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24 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98,  114 (2001);
Rosenberger Rector, University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).  Cf. Locke v. Davey, 124 S.
Ct. 1307, 1311(2004) (ruling that states have “play in the joints” in deciding whether or not to include
religion in general assistance programs).
25 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting).
26 For further discussion of the rationale for and relations between these themes, see Steven D.
Smith, The Pluralist Predicament: Contemporary Theorizing in the Law of Religious Freedom, 10 Legal
Theory 51, 55-66 (2004).
9
the participants in public service programs24; such neutrality-based inclusion creates a tension with a
commitment to keeping government within the domain of the “secular.”  So one might think that “public
secularism” and “neutrality” are at odds with each other, at least in some contexts, and that courts
would have to choose between them.  Which is it– “secularism” or “neutrality”?  And indeed this
tension is easily visible in, for example, the resistance of more separationist Justices to the neutrality
theme in some school aid or school voucher cases.25
Still, the dominant understanding in modern religion clause jurisprudence– I am merely
reporting, not commending-- seems to view these principles not merely as compatible but as entailing
each other, or even as merely different labels for or dimensions of the same basic principle. 
Government must be religiously “neutral,” and it maintains its neutrality by being “secular.”  Or
government must be “secular,” and this restriction entails that government must be religiously “neutral.”26
Nonsectarianism.  We’ve looked at “public secularism” and “neutrality”; so then what would a
“nonsectarian” principle contemplate?  I have already noted that the “nonsectarian” theme is often
conflated with the others that I have already mentioned.  And it is not hard to see how this might
happen.  Suppose we take the term “sectarian,” as people sometimes do, to be a rough synonym for
10
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27 The same dictionary cited earlier, see supra note 11 at 1044, gives as its first definition of
“sect” “a dissenting or schismatic religious body; esp: one regarded as extreme or heretical.”  For the
noun “sectarian” it offers two definitions: “an adherent of a sect” and “a narrow or bigoted person.”
10
“religious.”  Then “nonsectarian” comes to mean “not religious.”  “Not religious,” as we have seen, is
the dominant modern meaning of “secular.”  So a “nonsectarian” state would by this understanding
necessarily be a “secular” state.  And by whatever logic or abuse thereof the modern understanding has
come to equate public “secularism” with “neutrality,” “nonsectarian” would in turn come to be
equivalent to “neutral.”
So the principles can be viewed as a unified bundle, and I suspect they often are viewed in this
way.  Indeed, I suspect that the “neutrality” and “public secularism” principles gain much of their appeal
by presenting themselves as restatements of the “nonsectarian” principle.  But “nonsectarian” also can
have (and more naturally or conventionally does have) an importantly different meaning– a meaning that
is potentially valuable and hence should not be squandered by lumping it into an undifferentiated
secularism or neutrality.
So I will observe that the term “sect” is typically not taken to be synonymous with “religion.” 
Rather, it refers to one specific denomination or party picked out of a set of many denominations or
parties.  Often “sect” connotes not merely a single religious party but a narrowly self-defining and
inward-looking party.27  In this sense, “sectarian” would describe the kind of religion that is narrow, or
exclusive, or inward-looking.  Conversely, “nonsectarian” would not mean “not religious,” or “secular.” 
Rather, it would describe a position or attitude that engages with issues affecting religion in an inclusive
or ecumenical spirit.  A nonsectarian approach would emphasize and appeal to what different “sects”
11
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11
share with each other and with nonreligious parties and perspectives.
Taken in this entirely familiar sense, “nonsectarian” cannot be “either/or” or “once-and-for-all.” 
Though the disciples of “public reason” may try to wish the fact away, in the world we inhabit it is rarely
possible for the state to act on beliefs that everyone shares.  Consequently, “nonsectarian” is of
necessity a term of degree: it is more like terms such as “bright” or “small” or “quick” than it is like
qualities such as “pregnant” or “college graduate” or “registered voter”– qualities that in their
conventional usage one usually either has or does not have.  And the degree to which a measure is
“nonsectarian” will vary with context: a position that might seem uncontroversially “nonsectarian” in one
time and place– in a nineteenth century New England town, for example, in which nearly everyone may
have been some variety of Protestant– will seem less so when other-minded believers enter the picture.
Taken as a potential constitutional principle, therefore, “nonsectarianism” could not be a sort of
“all-or-nothing” command with a concrete meaning that stays constant over time and place.  Instead, it
would need to be understood more as an admonition to be as inclusive as circumstances permit, or to
avoid gratuitous and potentially divisive religious specificity.
I will try to clarify the notion of nonsectarianism further as this lecture proceeds.  But first, we
can consider some reasons why a nonsectarian principle might be attractive.
THE SUPERIORITY OF THE NONSECTARIAN PRINCIPLE
We have seen that, contrary to common usage, the nonsectarian principle is importantly
different than the public secularism and neutrality principles.  Still, the fact that they are often conflated
suggests that there are family resemblances.  In particular, all three principles have a common purpose:
12
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28 That goal is manifest in judicial discussions of the “no endorsement” doctrine– the purpose of
the doctrine, the Justices say, is to prevent citizens from feeling like “outsiders,” see, e.g., Allegheny
County, 492 U.S. at 595 (plurality opinion by Blackmun, J.); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).– and in the Ninth Circuit’s explanation in Newdow of its decision striking “under God”
from the Pledge.  292 F.3d at 608.
29 A useful, quick summary of the evidence for this claim is offered in Justice Scalia’s dissenting
opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632-36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  A more detailed and
careful exposition, emphasizing the development of the principle in the nineteenth century, is given in a
recent article by Noah Feldman. Noah Feldman, Nonsectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J. Law & Politics
65 (2003).
30 Reprinted in The Supreme Court on Church and State 25 (Robert S. Alley ed. 1988).
12
they seek to promote the goal of inclusive community in a pluralistic society.28
This is, to be sure, a laudable purpose, and all three principles attempt to serve it.  How then
should we choose among them?  I want in this section of the paper to offer three reasons for preferring
the nonsectarian principle.  Probably these reasons overlap to a considerable extent; even so, I think
they serve to highlight different aspects of the case for nonsectarianism.  We might for short refer to
these reasons as the arguments from tradition, from political viability, and from candor.
Tradition.  The first argument observes that there is a strong theme of nonsectarianism in
revered parts of the American constitutional tradition.29  For present purposes, we might look
specifically at two prominent examples.  So consider first Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom– probably this country’s seminal enactment on the subject of religious freedom.  The Statute
begins by proclaiming that “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” and it goes on to assert that
compulsion in matters of religion represents “a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of our
religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either,
as was in his Almighty power to do . . . .”30  This is overtly, even aggressively religious language: it
13
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31 John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of our Country 75 (1998).
32 Elton Trueblood, Abraham Lincoln: Theologian of American Anguish 135-38 (1973).
33 As it happens, Lincoln was superbly, perhaps uniquely qualified, to expound and reflect the
nonsectarian position– because this was his own hard-won view.  Throughout his life Lincoln struggled
with religious questions; and he pored over the Bible, talked with religionists of various stripes, and
13
hardly seems consistent with a public posture of nonreligious “secularism,” or of “neutrality” toward
religion.  But the phrase “Almighty God” also resulted from the defeat of an attempt in committee to
specify that the “Lord both of body and mind” was Jesus Christ.31  Jefferson’s language can thus be
classified as “nonsectarian,” because it attempted to appeal to premises that most citizens of the time
could accept.
As a second example, consider Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address– a stunningly profound
statement which a London newspaper described at the time as “the noblest political document known
to history.”  Lincoln’s speech is pervasively religious; it is, as Elton Trueblood observed, a “theological
classic,” containing within its twenty-five sentences “fourteen references to God, many scriptural
allusions, and four direct quotations from the Bible.”32  Its religious appeal is the more powerful because
it was not the slick product of professional speech writers but rather the expression of a lifetime of
intense, often agonized reflection.  Nonetheless, the speech carefully refrains from taking any narrowly
sectarian position.  Its nonsectarian attitude is not only performative, but is explicitly articulated:
Americans of very different views, Lincoln observed, had “read the same Bible and prayed to the same
God.”  And the culmination of this nonsectarian posture was Lincoln’s famous exhortation that
Americans go forward “with malice toward none, with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God
gives us to see the right. . . .”33
14
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often attended their services.  But he was unable to embrace any particular sect. His elusive stance has
been susceptible to various interpretations; but amidst the uncertainties I think we can confidently say
that Lincoln’s faith was at once deep and nonsectarian.  For further discussion, see Smith, Getting Over
Equality, supra note 2 at  177-84.
34 A more complete statement would no doubt acknowledge a sectarian tradition as well.  Cf.
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 604 (“The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains
numerous examples of official acts that endorsed Christianity . . . “).
35 Donald W. Livingstone, The Founding and the Enlightenment: Two Theories of Sovereignty,
in Vital Remnants: America’s Founding and the Western Tradition 243, 244 (Gary L. Gregg II ed.
1999). (“Tradition is the great horror of the Enlightenment”).
14
These instances of nonsectarianism could easily be multiplied.  And there is plenty of recent
evidence, including President Bush’s speeches to the nation immediately following the September 11
tragedy quoting scripture and imploring Americans to join with him in prayer.  No lengthy rehearsal of
the evidence seems necessary, because the conclusion seems inescapable.  The “secularism” and
“neutrality” principles are embarrassed by the fact of repeated, constant, explicit public endorsements
and invocations of religion, beginning before the Constitution was adopted and continuing to the present
day.  By contrast, there is a long-standing (though imperfectly honored 34) American tradition of
seeking to keep government and its expressions as nonsectarian as circumstances permit.  Thus, the
nonsectarian principle, unlike its competitors that often try to piggyback on it, can claim strong support
in our constitutional tradition.
Political viability.  Though the nonsectarian principle is more securely grounded in our
tradition than its competitors, this fact will strike some people as a dubious recommendation.  For a
nation born in the Enlightenment, “tradition” has always been at best a suspect category. 35 But a related
point can be made in terms of political viability.  Many of our most central constitutional commitment,
15
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36 See William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality?  An Assessment of the Equal
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 Ind. L.J. 193, 203
(2000) (describing “the equality of ideas principle that lies at the heart of the Free Speech Clause” and
explaining that “the equality of ideas principle posits that every idea has equal dignity in the competition
for acceptance in the marketplace of ideas”).
15
that is, are arguably grounded in religious values or premises.  At least according to one widely held and
plausible view, religion did not merely provide the vocabulary in which these commitments were
articulated; it was and is part of their very logic.  Consequently, a principle that forbids governmental
invocation of religion may have the effect of rendering us tongue-tied when it comes to explaining our
most basic political commitments.  And muteness on the most basic matters is not a promising
foundation for enduring political community.
Consider, for instance, the commitment to equality.  The Declaration of Independence asserts,
as one of the central truths on which the Republic was founded, that “all men are created equal.” 
Lincoln likewise in the Gettysburg Address recited this claim and said that the nation was founded on
the basis of a dedication to that proposition.  In recent decades equality has become arguably the
central value in some of our most justly celebrated political movements (in particular the civil rights
movement), in a good deal of political philosophy, and also in much constitutional law, not only under
the equal protection clause but in First Amendment jurisprudence as well.36  Yet this assertion of
equality or equal worth, ennobling and exhilarating though it may be, is not on its face intuitively
compelling, or even plausible.
George Fletcher observes that “[a]s a descriptive matter, the thesis that ‘all men are created
equal’ is obviously false.  People differ in every conceivable respect– size, strength, intelligence, musical
16
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37 George P. Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution 95 (2001).
38 Id. at 102.
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talent, beauty.”37  So then what is the justification for saying that all persons are in some important sense
of equal worth?  The Declaration of Independence is quite clear in offering a religious foundation for the
doctrine of equality: we “are created” equal, and we are equal at least in the sense that we “are
endowed by [our] Creator” with rights.  Thus, as Fletcher explains, “[b]ehind those created equal
stands a Creator– the source as well of our basic human rights . . .”38
Perhaps the commitment to equality can today be defended on purely nonreligious grounds– but
perhaps not.  In a recent book, Jeremy Waldron argues that John Locke’s commitment to equality was
firmly based in religious assumptions, and that modern efforts to support the commitment on purely
secular assumptions have not to this point succeeded.39 Waldron’s concluding observations sound
faintly ominous:
[M]aybe the notion of humans as one another’s equals will begin to fall apart, under
pressure, without the presence of the religious conception that shaped it. . . . 
Locke believed this general acceptance [of equality] was impossible apart from the
principle’s foundation in religious teaching.  We believe otherwise.  Locke, I suspect,
would have thought we were taking a risk.  And I am afraid it is not entirely clear, given
our experience of a world and a century in which politics and public reason have cut
loose from these foundations, that his cautions and suspicions were unjustified.40
The same may be said, arguably, of our foundational commitment to human rights.  This
commitment seems central to our constitutional order, and once again, our seminal statement of that
commitment justifies it on a religious premise: our inalienable rights are those with which we are
17
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“endowed by our Creator.”  We have seen, of course, a variety of efforts to justify human rights on
nonreligious grounds, but the success of these efforts is doubtful.41  Often rights are linked to something
like “human dignity,” but both that quality itself and its capacity to generate “rights” remain obscure. 
And in any case, the appeal to dignity may only push the question back a step, because as Mary Ann
Glendon observes,  “[m]ost [religious] believers . . . would say that dignity is grounded in the fact that
human beings are made in the image and likeness of God.”42   Thus, Michael Perry has argued that the
idea of human rights is “ineliminably religious”; I have argued for a similar conclusion on quite different
grounds.43
All of these questions are hotly contested, of course, and I certainly don’t pretend to have
demonstrated here that our commitments to equality and to rights necessarily rest on a religious
foundation.  This is what I think I can safely say: that our commitments to equality and to rights were as
a historical matter justified on religious premises, that many people today still do accept these
commitments on religious grounds, and that at least some thinkers believe that the commitments cannot
be justified except on religious grounds.  I concede that those who hold this view (and I include myself
in the group) might be wrong.  Even so, by inhibiting us as a public matter from reaffirming and relying
on those grounds, the secularism and neutrality principles subtly place at risk the viability of our
18
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constitutional enterprise over the long haul.
Candor.  This observation leads to my third reason for preferring the nonsectarian principle: it
allows for the possibility of candor.  Proponents of a constitutional principle do not offer it simply as a
good idea, or as the political position they happen to find attractive: they introduce the principle with
phrases like “the Constitution requires . . .,” and this introduction typically calls for some attempt to
reconcile the preferred principle with long-standing constitutional practices and precedents.  If a
principle is in fact contrary to our tradition, that attempt will usually call for some amount of . . . shall we
say, artful pleading.  And if the principle is also contrary to current practices which neither the polity nor
the Justices are eager to relinquish, then further (usually not very artistic) artfulness will be called for in
the attempt to explain why, contrary to first impressions (and second impressions, and third
impressions), the principle does not require that these practices be eliminated after all.   These efforts,
however, can strain the discourse.  At some point the deceptiveness becomes so transparent that the
discourse loses all credibility 44: “everyone knows” that the courts cannot really mean what they are
forced, over and over again, to say.
There is ample reason to believe that the constitutional discourse of religious freedom has for
some time persisted in approximately this condition.  The evidence for this claim is abundant, but for the
moment it may be enough to cite the layers of obfuscation that have arisen– of necessity, I think--
around the modern “no endorsement” doctrine, which figured centrally in the Ninth Circuit’s Newdow
19
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The problem arises because the Justices– or several of them, anyway– find irresistible the
proposition that government should not make anyone feel like an “outsider” by endorsing religion; but
these same Justices also are not prepared to declare “free exercise exemptions” for religious objectors
unconstitutional, nor are they about to rule that the national motto “In God We Trust” violates the
Constitution– much less that Jefferson and Madison and the Founders transgressed a prospective
constitutional principle when they wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and the Declaration
of Independence . . . or that Lincoln violated the Constitution in his Second Inaugural or in his
Gettysburg Address (which of course contained that same words that the Ninth Circuit recently found
offensive: “one nation under God”), . . . or that George Bush violated the Constitution in his September
11 speeches.  So how to square these seemingly incompatible inclinations?
As a first step, we might draw a distinction between endorsement of religion and, say, the
accommodation of religion45 that would allow for free exercise exemptions.  But this distinction reflects
a false dichotomy: it is reminiscent of the student who says, “I didn’t skip class; I just stayed home.” 
There are lots of people and lots of causes who would like to be accommodated by the law– to be
exempted from the draft, for instance, or from other burdensome laws– so if we single out religious
objectors to accommodate them while declining various other objectors, it is hard not to discern a kind
of endorsement of religion in that selective accommodation.
And in any case, this distinction (or a similar distinction between, say, endorsing and
20
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acknowledging religion46) would not excuse what appear to be explicit governmental statements
favorable to or approving of religion (such as the national motto).  So further qualifications are needed. 
Why is it not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion to put “In God We Trust” on all of the nation’s
dimes and quarters and nickels?  Why is it not a violation to begin sessions of the Supreme Court with
the ringing plea “God save the United States and this Honorable Court”?
Well, the Justices explain, those expressions serve to solemnize public occasions, or to express
confidence in the future, or to encourage recognition of what is worthy in society.47  Maybe, but it
seems we are piling up the false dichotomies.  “God save the United States” is not the sort of
expression that either endorses religion or solemnizes a public occasion: it plainly does both.  Indeed, it
solemnizes precisely by invoking God’s blessing, thereby surely endorsing religion.
So the Justices add that these expressions “have lost through rote repetition any religious
content.”48  And if skeptics point out that many real people still do perceive religious content in words
like “In God We Trust,” the Justices visit one final indignity upon us: they explain that for these
constitutional purposes it is not real people whose perceptions count.  Rather, what matters is whether
a “reasonable” or “objective” observer would perceive a message of endorsement.49
This last embellishment on the “no endorsement” doctrine seems at once inevitable and deeply
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perverse.  A doctrine that begins with the laudable objective of preventing anyone from feeling like an
outsider on the basis of religion culminates in a construction that tells those offended by what they
sincerely perceive to be a religious or anti-religious message not only that the message is legitimate but
that their perception to the contrary does not count because they are not “reasonable” observers.  So
the doctrine sets out to remove injury but instead merely adds insult.
Still, it is important to see that this “reasonable observer” test is a natural, probably necessary,
corollary to the “no endorsement” doctrine.  The “reasonable observer” technique may seem
disingenuous, but I suspect that everyone who favors the “no endorsement” test will have to resort to it
at some point.  For example, you may be among the significant minority of citizens who are perfectly
willing to honor the perceptions of actual citizens by striking “under God” from the Pledge, or “In God
We Trust” from coins.50  So you may dismiss with contempt the Justices’ explanation that a
“reasonable” observer would see no endorsement of religion in these expressions.  And you may be
willing to say, on the same grounds, that George Bush routinely violates a constitutional principle in his
official, presidential speeches (as probably every President before him has done)-- and that Lincoln,
and Madison, and even the great Jefferson deviated from constitutional principle when they invoked
deity not just as private persons, but in their official expressions. 51  Okay so far.  But I think we can
22
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treat it as almost axiomatic that in a country as religiously diverse as this one, virtually anything
government does will be perceived by someone as endorsing or disapproving of religion.52  So, to
borrow a far-fetched example from Justice Stevens, what do you say to the person who thinks that an
“exotic cow” in the national zoo conveys “the Government’s approval of the Hindu religion”?53  Or to
Douglas Laycock, who has suggested that at least in principle the names of cities like Los Angeles or
Corpus Christi are unconstitutional endorsements of religion?54  Or, to use a much more realistic and
recurring example, you may think that public Christmas displays including creches just do endorse
Christianity, and that Justice O’Connor’s claim that a “reasonable” observer would not see it this way
(at least if there are enough Santas and elves around) borders on insulting.55  But then what do you say
to all of those citizens who protest that removing the creche is “taking Christ out of Christmas” and
thereby expressing a message of hostility toward Christianity?  At some point, I suspect, all of us will be
23
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forced to resort to the Court’s “reasonable observer” device.  “You may perceive it that way,” we will
say, “but a reasonable observer wouldn’t.  You’re just being obtuse.  Get a life.”
Or at least we will have to say something like this if we continue to insist that the Constitution
commands government to be secular and religiously neutral, and thereby prohibits government from
saying or doing things that endorse or disapprove of religion.  And that is my point: these (admittedly
quite alluring and well-intended) principles are so radically inconsistent with the reality of our political
traditions and current practices that they can only be maintained by multiplying spurious dichotomies
and transparent fictions, until the discourse becomes rampantly incredible.  Modern First Amendment
discourse inures us to such deceptions until, properly educated, we can believe– or at least say– six
impossible things before breakfast56 without batting an eye.
It is a virtue of the nonsectarian principle, I think, that it does not demand this sacrifice of us. 
The nonsectarian principle permits us– though of course it does not compel us– to be honest.  Of
course, honesty has its costs.  In particular, the candor that the nonsectarian principle permits includes
candor about one disquieting but inescapable reality: government often cannot be neutral among
24
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conflicting beliefs– not even among conflicting religious beliefs.  So government cannot avoid treating
some citizens on some occasions as “outsiders” or “second class citizens”– at least if those notions are
used in the unnecessary and unfortunate sense in which the modern decisions use them.  The governing
of a political community necessarily involves judgments and beliefs; and in a large and diverse
community some of those judgments and beliefs will inevitably be controversial; and many of those
controversies will have a religious dimension (at least for many citizens).  So the best we can hope for,
to paraphrase Lincoln, is that government might act on beliefs that are acceptable to some of the people
all of the time and all of the people some of the time; but it simply will not be able to act on beliefs that
are acceptable to all of the people all of the time.  And the sooner we admit this painful fact, the sooner
we may be able to begin to develop a more mature and realistic First Amendment discourse– and a
more honest self-understanding.
APPLYING NONSECTARIANISM
But what would a nonsectarian principle mean in practice?  I hope that the previous discussion
has already shed some light on that question, both through general explanation of the principle and
through the two historical examples I have mentioned– namely, Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom and Lincoln’s Second Inaugural.  Still, further clarification and a more contemporary
application may help illustrate the principle.
So let me start by reiterating that the nonsectarian principle is not an “either/or” formula that we
can simply slap down on any challenged expression or practice, extracted from its context, and then
conclude that the expression or practice is or is not “nonsectarian.”  The principle is one of degree and
25
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context.  It urges government to be as ecumenical and inclusive as its purposes and the circumstances
permit.  At least within the domain of the “secular” in its positive sense,57 government is not forbidden to
act on religious beliefs or to make religious expressions; but government should avoid acting on religion
in ways that are unnecessarily or gratuitously narrow or exclusionary.
Caveats.  Could we borrow the standard terminology of constitutional doctrine and say that the
“nonsectarian” principle means that government should not invoke religion except as “necessary” for
some legitimate purpose?  I would accept this formulation with two important caveats.  First, it would
be imprudent, I think, to hobble the principle with the sort of cheap, mechanical “rationalism” that so
often appears in constitutional decisions and that my former colleague Robert Nagel has so persuasively
criticized.58  To put the point differently, like other constitutional principles, this one is best implemented
with the support of a Burkean sensibility that understands that in the maintenance of a complex political
and cultural order, it is a grave misunderstanding to suppose that we can assess any particular measure
by simply ticking off two or three discrete objectives or “interests” that the measure is supposed to
achieve and then asking whether the measure is successful and necessary in achieving those interests. 
History and culture are more subtle and interconnected than that.
Second, and relatedly, in this context “necessary” would need to be understood in
approximately the sense that John Marshall famously elaborated in McCulloch v. Maryland,59 and for
much the same reason.  “Necessary,” that is, cannot be taken to mean that some particular means is
26
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“absolutely” or “indispensably” necessary in its particularity, because no particular means or expression
will satisfy that test: but means and expressions are necessary.  There is more than one way for me to
return home to San Diego from here– I could go by car, or bus, or train, or plane– so no particular
means of transportation is strictly necessary; but still I do need to select one of these methods, and
whichever one I select will be a particular one.  In a similar vein, Marshall explained that in deciding
whether an exercise of congressional power is “necessary” it would be a fallacy to imagine that we
could mean “absolutely” necessary, because in most cases more than one means of pursuing an
objective is possible and we would thereby prevent ourselves from adopting any means at all.
Public expressions of reasons– for a particular measure, such as Jefferson’s Virginia Bill or the
Declaration of Independence, or for a more general attitude of loyalty, as in the Pledge of Allegiance–
have this same quality, I think.  Usually no particular expression will be absolutely necessary,
considered in isolation.  But our form of government, resting heavily on the consent of the governed,
depends on a tradition of public reason-giving– of the public giving of reasons calculated to engage with
and elicit the citizens’ actual beliefs– both for specific public actions and for general support of the
government.  So in deciding whether any particular reasons are “necessary,” we would do well to be
guided by John Marshall’s observation that a means should be considered “necessary” if it is
“appropriate” and “plainly adapted” to its end.
In assessing particular expressions of reasons, these inquiries implicate not only the intellectual
but also the cultural dimensions of a particular controversy.  Suppose you ask why you should not cheat
on your tax filings; and knowing know that you are a committed utilitarian, I nonetheless respond to
your question with a careful Kantian explanation: even if this reason satisfies some abstract test of
27
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philosophical adequacy, it still will not be a reason that speaks to you.  In the same way, in our practice
of public reason-giving, the adequacy of a reason will depend not only on its cogency as an abstract
intellectual matter but also on its resonance with the beliefs actually present in the American political
community.  Take Jefferson’s well known statement that “the only firm basis” for liberties is “a
conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God.”60   That claim might or
might not be correct as a universal proposition, or as a philosophical matter; but even if it is not, it might
still be a cogent report on the condition of rights in the American cultural context.
These caveats lead me to acknowledge a feature of the nonsectarian principle that some people
will see as a damning deficiency but that I regard as a major virtue: properly understood, the principle is
not conducive to an aggressive judicial role in policing the practices of American governments for
establishment clause violations.  It would be incorrect to say that the principle precludes any judicial
oversight.  If you are like other audiences, you will easily be able to challenge me with hypothetical
examples of actions that would obviously violate a nonsectarian principle, and that a court could
accordingly enjoin.  “What if the City Council voted to allocate half of its budget to the erection of a
100-foot high golden statute of Jesus in the town square?”  And so forth.  Still, cases as clear as this will
probably be rare.  If the nonsectarian principle is applied in actual cases with the Burkean sensibility
that I have alluded to and with a McCulloch sense of “necessity,”61 then a responsible court would be
reluctant to pronounce some particular measure invalid, especially if it has through long tenure been
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woven into the texture of a community’s culture or institutions.
The principle is thus best understood as an aspiration for the community as a whole– one that
contemplates sparing judicial enforcement, much in the same way that McCulloch itself contemplated
sparing judicial enforcement of the Constitution’s “enumerated powers” principle.   This consequence of
the principle will be troublesome for those who have great confidence in the judgments of courts
combined with a serious distrust of our non-judicial institutions, or of the American people themselves. 
I have discussed the issue elsewhere,62 but for now I will merely acknowledge the consequence and
observe that in my view, our history and modern experience give no adequate grounds for this
combination of confidence and distrust.  Moreover, if those attitudes are in fact justified, then I doubt
that there is much hope that government “of the people, by the people, for the people” can “long
endure.”
Jefferson’s Statute Revisited.  With these explanations, we can return to Jefferson’s Virginia
Statute for Religious Freedom to illustrate the nonsectarian principle a bit more closely before
considering a more current example.  As noted, the act began by asserting that “Almighty God created
the mind free,” and it proceeded to elaborate on this rationale for religious freedom.  I have already
noted that this invocation of deity was neither “secular” in the dominant modern sense nor religiously
neutral; but it was “nonsectarian,” at least in contrast to more specifically Christian language that some
legislators preferred.  So we can imagine a more sectarian version using such Christian language: “Christ
the Lord created the mind free.”  And it is even possible– who knows?–  that a majority of Virginians
29
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were Christians and that, given the choice, they would have voted for the more sectarian version.  Even
so, the Christian language would have been gratuitous.  Christians believed in “Almighty God,” after all,
and the language of “Almighty God” fully conveyed the rationale for rights.  So there was no good
reason to limit the rationale to Christians.
Conversely, there may well have been Virginians who found even the more nonsectarian
version offensive: they may not have believed in God, for example, or they may not have believed that
God created the mind free.  So why not delete the religious rationale altogether, we might ask, and
substitute a purely secular rationale?  But given the beliefs of Virginians of the time, it may be that no
nonreligious rationale could have commanded anything approaching the level of assent that the religious
rationale could.
In short, the more Christian rationale would have been gratuitously exclusive, while a
nonreligious rationale (though more acceptable to some) might not have served the purpose.  If so, then
the nonsectarian rationale alluding to “Almighty God” may have been “necessary,” in a McCulloch
sense, to the purpose. 
UNDER GOD?  UNDER VISHNU?
Which brings us back to the Pledge of Allegiance, and the words “under God”?  Although it is
entirely possible that the Supreme Court will eventually uphold these words by invoking one of the
spurious distinctions mentioned earlier and denying that the words send any message endorsing
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religion,63 I take it that this is an explanation that few people will really find believable.  To most people
I know, “God” is closely associated with religion, so the assertion that something is “under God” seems
pretty religious.  But that fact alone should not invalidate the words.  The question ought rather to be
whether the words comply with the nonsectarian principle.  Are they unnecessarily or gratuitously
religious in an exclusive sense relative to the purpose of the Pledge?
Given the reaction to the Newdow decision, I think we can fairly infer that a sizable majority of
Americans prefers to have the words in the Pledge.  And survey evidence shows that an overwhelming
majority of Americans believes in God.  These facts are relevant to the question I have posed, but they
are not decisive.  Conversely, critics of the words can point out that they are not strictly “necessary.” 
We could have a Pledge without those words; indeed, until 1954 we did have a Pledge without the
words.  That fact is also relevant to our question but not decisive.
The central question, once again, is whether the words are “necessary,” in a McCulloch sense,
to the purpose of the Pledge.  That purpose, I take it, is to evoke and express loyalty on the part of
citizens to the sort of Republic succinctly described in the Pledge.  So is it an important feature of that
Republic that it is “under God”?  Obviously, citizens disagree about this question, in a variety of ways. 
Some may grant, as a purely descriptive and historical matter, that there is a long tradition (running from
Washington to Jefferson and Madison to Lincoln to the second Bush) of using theistic rhetoric in
official and ceremonial pronouncements; and yet they may doubt that “under God” has truly been
essential to Americans’ conception of their Republic.  Others may think that theistic foundations have
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been a central part of the American political tradition but that we are by now mature enough to discard
this objectionable element.64  Still others may think that an America unwilling to acknowledge publicly
and officially that it is “under God” would no longer command their serious allegiance.  Or, for reasons
alluded to above in the discussion of equality, they may think that bereft of our public commitment to a
higher source the foundations of our Republic would be arbitrary and fragile.65
Though I incline to the latter view,66 I’m not going to argue for it here.  Instead, I will limit
myself to two observations.  First, the historical sequence of explicitly adding (or subtracting) words is
relevant to this question, but not in any straightforward or simplistic sense.  Adding words to a recitation
or creed may change its meaning; conversely, the addition may merely make explicit what was all along
understood, but in a changed context in which failure to add the words would in fact reflect a change in
meaning.  Suppose that you have not been in the habit of explicitly saying that you love your spouse–
you’re the strong, silent type, maybe, and in any case the fact has seemed too obvious to need saying–
but then a situation arises in which your commitment is seriously called into question.  Saying “I love
you” at this point might merely make explicit what was all along understood and went “without saying”;
conversely, an omission to say the words in this context might indicate a major change in what had
previously been understood.  The words “under God” were explicitly added to the Pledge in 1954 in
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part in an effort to distinguish the American community from Communist foes,67 but given the long
history of such pronouncements and the fact that the phrase echoes Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, I
think it would be hard to argue that this addition reflected any revision in the American self-
understanding.  It seems far more plausible to suppose that taking the words out would be the
revisionary gesture.
Second, to return to the argument from Newdow with which we began, I think we can be
confident in saying that whether or not the words “under God” are unnecessarily exclusive, 
they are emphatically not identical, from the perspective of the nonsectarian principle, to “under Jesus,”
under “Vishnu,” or “under no god.”68  From this perspective, whether these statements are “identical” is
not something that can be determined by extracting them from their cultural context and measuring the
denatured remainders against an abstract standard like “neutrality.”  Instead, we need to consider them
in the context of the Pledge and its function in the American Republic– a community with a history and
composed of real people with real beliefs.
And when we look at the question in this more realistic light, it is quickly apparent, for example,
that to equate “under God” with “under no God” is akin to asserting the identity of white and black.  
The Pledge, after all, is a pledge of allegiance; but the phrase of negation, far from expressing and
eliciting the allegiance of the citizens, would amount to a gratuitous insult to the beliefs held by a majority
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69 For example, although Christianity has surely been historically important in the development
of Western commitments to values such as human rights and equality, it is arguable that its political
significance in promoting these commitments has derived not so much from its distinctively Christian
theology as from its capacity to carry, support, and develop a classical natural law tradition. See, e.g.,
John Courtney Murray, S. J., We Hold These Truths (1960).
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of Americans.  Though to be sure it might make the Pledge more attractive to a small minority, “under
no God” would forfeit the loyalty of countless others, and thus would drastically undermine the purpose
of the Pledge.
By contrast, it may well be that a majority of Americans believes that the Republic is in some
sense “under Jesus.”  It is even imaginable that if the question were put to a vote, a majority of
Americans would elect to include this more specific language in the Pledge (though I seriously doubt
this).  Even so, from the perspective of the nonsectarian principle, “under Jesus” is emphatically not
identical to “under God,” as the Newdow court asserted.  “Under Jesus” is a far more exclusive
statement, obviously.  Moreover, it seems to be gratuitously exclusive because even on the (perhaps
debatable) assumption that most Americans have been and are Christians, it is not clear how our
political commitments– to equality, to natural rights– depend on anything that is distinctively or
exclusively Christian.69  Probably the two statesmen and thinkers to whom we most often appeal for
almost prophetic statements of the meaning of America have been Jefferson and Lincoln; and although
deity or Providence figure prominently and essentially in each man’s thought, it is doubtful that either
was a Christian in any very secure and orthodox sense.
CONCLUSION
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In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s claim of identity among the assertions “under God,” “under Jesus,”
“under Vishnu,” and “under no god” is from one perspective plausible; from another perspective the
claim is preposterous.  I think the sense in which the claim is preposterous is the important one.  But in
any case the difference helps to underscore the vital distinction among principles that are often
conflated.  If any sort of order and honesty is to be introduced into First Amendment jurisprudence, I
think that the conflation needs to be corrected.  We need to recover our “nonsectarian” tradition from
the notions of neutrality and secularity that have served to subvert it.
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